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Value versus Growth Real Estate Investment Strategy: Is the Win a Flash in the Pan? 
 
Abstract 
The superiority of the contrarian investment strategy, though well attested in the finance 
literature, is being questioned in some quarters on the pretext that the gap between the 
performance of value and growth investment narrows over time. If this is proven to be 
true, it would imply that value real estate investment may not be advisable given that real 
estate is a medium to long term investment. This paper uses empirical real estate 
investment return data from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3 for US, and some Asia Pacific cities to 
ascertain whether the superiority of “value” over “growth” real estate investment is a 
“flash” in the pan, i.e. unsustainable. The office, industrial and retail property 
investments are examined. In addition to confirming the relative superiority of “value” 
over “growth” property investment, the results show that office and industrial property 
investments exhibit return reversal. This implies that the “win” is sustainable. Although 
the returns from retail property investment display inertia, the results of stochastic 
dominance test validate the relative superiority of “value” over “growth” property 
investment for all the three sectors. This implies that fund managers who traditionally 
have been favoring prime (i.e. growth) property investment may have to reconsider their 
investment strategy if they want to maximize their return. 
 
Keywords: contrarian investment strategy, value-growth spread, value properties, 
growth properties, stochastic dominance, mean reversion. 
 
Introduction 
The choice of an investment strategy is an important step in the decision-making process 
of fund managers and large institutional investors. In view of this, growth stock 
investment strategy and value stock investment strategy have received considerable 
attention in the finance literature. The growth stock investment strategy is frequently 
associated with investments in “glamour” stocks that have relatively high price-to-
earnings ratios (i.e. high gross income multiplier in real estate terms). On the other hand, 
value stock investment strategy usually involves investing in “gloomy” stocks that 
characteristically have relatively low market prices in relation to earnings per share 
(EPS),  cash flow per share,  book value per share, or  dividend per share (i.e. low gross 
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income multiplier).  They are often less popular stocks that have recently experienced 
low or negative growth rates in corporate earnings. Notwithstanding their relative 
unpopularity with investors, studies have shown that investments in value stocks, 
commonly known as contrarian investment strategy, have outperformed growth stocks in 
major markets (see for example, Fama and French [1993, 1995, 1996, 1998], Capual et 
al. [1993], Lakonishok et al. [1994], Haugen [1995], Arshanapali et al. [1998], Levis and 
Liodakis [2001], Badrinath and Omesh [2001] and Chan and Lakonishok [2004]).  
 
However, Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of contrarian portfolios is a pre-WW 
II phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. Furthermore, Kryzanowski and Zhang 
(1992) find that the Canadian stock market exhibits significant price inertia, which 
negates the relative superiority of contrarian investments. These contrary findings have 
been refuted (see for example, Bauman and Miller [1997]). 
 
In view of the overwhelming evidence in support of the superior performance of 
contrarian investment in the finance literature, there appears to be a prima facie case for 
expecting contrarian real estate investment to do likewise (Addae-Dapaah et al. (2002)).  
Growth stock is analogous to prime properties as both have relatively low earnings-to- 
price ratio (i.e. low initial yield) and investors in both investment media pin their hopes 
on a relatively high potential price or capital appreciation. Similarly, value stock that 
provides high income is comparable to high income-producing properties such as lower 
grade properties and properties in secondary locations. In relation to real property, the 
contrarian strategy implies that value properties with high running yield could outperform 
growth properties with low running yield. Thus, the objectives of the study are: 
i) to ascertain the comparative advantage(s), in terms of performance, of contrarian real 
estate investment; 
ii) to evaluate the relative riskiness of value properties and growth properties;  
iii) to establish whether excessive extrapolation and expectational errors characterize 
growth and value strategies; and 
iv)  to ascertain the sustainability of the relative superiority (the “win”) of contrarian real 
estate investment if such superiority is established. 
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In view of this, the next section provides a brief review of the finance literature on the 
contrarian investment strategy after which, a specific set of research hypotheses are 
formulated. This is followed by a discussion on data management and sourcing, and the 
contrarian strategy model. The next section is devoted to the empirical model estimation 
which is followed by a post-model estimation. The last section deals with concluding 
remarks. 
 
Literature Review 
According to Dreman (1982) a contrarian investor is an investor who goes against the 
“grain”. Thus, contrarian investment strategy simply refers to investment in securities 
which have lost favor with investors. It covers various investment strategies based on 
buying/selling stocks that are priced low/high relative to accounting measures of 
performance – earnings-to-price ratios (E/P), cash flow-to-price ratio (C/P) and book 
value-to-price ratio (B/P) – as well strategies based on low/high measures of earning per 
share (EPS) growth (Capual, 1993). In simple terms, the contrarian investment strategy 
refers to the value/growth stock paradigm. 
 
While there is substantial empirical evidence supporting the efficient market hypothesis 
that security prices provide unbiased estimates of the underlying values, many still 
question its validity. Smidt (1968) argues that one potential source of market inefficiency 
is inappropriate market responses to information. The inappropriate responses to 
information implicit in Price-Earnings (P/E) ratios may be indicators of future investment 
performance of a security. Proponents of this price-ratio hypothesis claim that low P/E 
securities tend to outperform high P/E stocks (Williamson, 1970). Basu (1977), Jaffe et 
al. (1989), Fama and French (1992, 1998), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), 
Bauman et al. (1998), Badrinath and Omesh (2001) and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) 
show a positive relationship between earnings yield and equity returns. However, as a 
result of the noisy nature of earnings (i.e. the category of stocks with low E/P include also 
stocks that have temporarily depressed earnings), value strategies based on E/P give 
narrower spreads compared to other simple value strategies (Chan and Lakonishok 
[2004]). Furthermore, in view of the noise in reported earnings that results from Japanese 
accounting standards (i.e. distortions in the earnings induced by accelerated depreciation 
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allowances), Chan et al. (1991) find no evidence of a strong positive earnings yield effect 
after controlling for the other fundamental variables.  
 
Rosenberg et al. (1985) show that stocks with high Book Value relative to Market Value 
of equity (BV/MV) outperform the market. Further studies, e.g. Chan et al. (1991) and 
Fama and French (1992), confirm and extend these results. In view of the highly 
influential paper by Fama and French (1992), academics (e.g. Capaul et al., 1993; Davis, 
1994; Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta et al., 1997; Fama and French, 1998; Bauman et 
al., 1998 and 2001; Chan et al., 2000; and Chan and Lakonishok, 2004) have shifted their 
attention to the ratio of BV/MV as one of the leading explanatory variables for the cross-
section of average stock returns.  
 
Although BV/MV has gained much credence as an indicator of value-growth orientation, 
it is by no means an ideal measure (Chan and Lakonishok (2004)). BV/MV is not a 
‘clean’ variable uniquely associated with economically interpretable characteristics of the 
firm (Lakonishok et al. (1994)). Many different factors are reflected in this ratio. For a 
example, low BV/MV may describe a company with several intangible assets that are not 
reflected in accounting book value. A low BV/MV can also describe a company with 
attractive growth opportunities that do not enter the computation of book value but do 
enter the market price. A stock whose risk is low and future cash flows are discounted at 
a low rate would have a low BV/MV as well. Finally, a low BV/MV may be reminiscent 
of an overvalued glamour stock.  
 
 
The shortcomings of accounting earnings have motivated a number of researchers to 
explore the relationship between cash flow yields and stock returns. High Cash Flow to 
Price (CF/P) stocks are identified as value stocks because their prices are low per dollar 
of cash flow, or the growth rate of their cash flows is expected to be low. Chan et al. 
(1991), Davis (1994), Lakonishok et al. (1994), Bauman et al. (1998), Fama and French 
(1998), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) show that a high ratio of CF/P predicts higher 
returns. This is consistent with the idea that measuring the market’s expectations of future 
growth more directly gives rise to better value strategies (La Porta (1996)).  
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Fama and French (1998) and Bauman et al. (1998) use the ratio of Dividends to Price 
(D/P) as a proxy for the market’s expectations of future growth. Firms with higher ratios 
have lower expected growth and are considered to be value stocks. They show that the 
performance of the value stocks based on dividend yields is quantitatively similar to the 
performance based on the prior categorizations (i.e. P/E, BV/MV and CF/P). Finally, 
instead of using expectations of future growth to operationalize the notions of glamour 
and value, Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) use past growth to classify stocks. 
Davis (1994) and Lakonishok et al. (1994) measure past growth by Growth in Sales (GS) 
to conclude that the spread in abnormal returns is sizeable.  
 
To the extent that the different valuation indicators of value-growth orientation are not 
highly correlated, a strategy based on information from several valuation measures may 
enhance portfolio performance. Lakonishok et al. (1994) explore sophiscated two-
dimensional versions of simple value strategies. According to the two-way classification, 
value stocks are defined as those that have shown poor growth in sales, earnings and cash 
flow in the past, and are expected by the market to continue growing slowly. Expected 
performance is measured by multiples of price to current earnings and cash flow. La 
Porta et al. (1997) form portfolios on the basis of a two-way classification based on past 
GS and CF/P introduced by Lakonishok et al. (1994). Using robust regression methods, 
Chan and Lakonishok (2004) estimate cross-sectional models that predicted future yearly 
returns from beginning-year values of the BV/MV, CF/P, E/P and the sales to price ratio. 
The use of the multiple measures in the composite indicators boosts the performance of 
the value strategy (see Gregory et al. [2003]).  
 
In contrast to the above findings, Jones (1993) reports that the profitability of contrarian 
portfolios is a pre-WW II phenomenon that has since largely disappeared. However, this 
has been refuted by later studies which include post-war data.  Also, Kryzanowski and 
Zhang (1992) suggest that positive profits resulting from the use of the contrarian 
investment strategy are limited to the U.S. stock market. When applied to the Canadian 
stock market, the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) do not produce favorable results. Instead of 
finding significant price reversals, Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find that the Canadian 
stock market exhibits significant price continuation behavior, which does not support 
contrarian investments. This is also refuted by later studies that conclude mean-reversion 
tendency (see for example, Bauman and Miller [1997]). 
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In view of the accumulated weight of the evidence from past studies, the finance 
academic fraternity agrees that value investment strategies, on average, outperform 
growth investment strategies. The only polemical issue about the contrarian strategy is 
the rationale for its superior performance. 
 
Rationale for Superior Performance of Contrarian Strategies 
 Competing explanations include risk premiums (Fama and French, 1993, 1995, 1996), 
systematic errors in investors’ expectations and analysts’ forecasts – i.e. naïve investor 
expectations of future growth and research design induced bias (see for example, La 
Porta et al., 1997; Bauman & Miller, 1997; La Porta, 1996; Dechow & Sloan, 1997; 
Lakonishok et al., 1994; Lo and MacKinlay, 1990; Kothari et al., 1995) and the existence 
of market frictions (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986) .The traditional view, led by Fama 
and French (1993, 1995, 1996), is that the superior performance is a function of 
contrarian investment being relatively risky (see also Chan, 1988; Ball and Kothari, 1989; 
Kothari and Shanken, 1992.). However, Lakonishok et al. (1994), MacKinley (1995), La 
Porta et al. (1995, 1997), Daniel and Titman (1996) have found that risk-based 
explanations do not provide a credible rationale for the observed return behaviour (see 
Jaffe et al., 1989; Chan et al., 1991; Chopra et al., 1992; Capaul et al., 1993; Dreman and 
Lufkin, 1997; Bauman et al., 1998, 2001; Nam et al., 2001; Gomes et al., 2003 and Chan 
and Lakonishok (2004)).  
 
 
The behavioural finance paradigm recognizes psychological influences on human 
decision-making in which experts (in this case, investors) tend to focus on, and overuse, 
predictors of limited validity (i.e., earnings trend in the recent past) in making forecasts 
(see Covel and Shumway, 2005). In view of systematic errors in investors’ expectations 
and analysts’ forecasts, it has been argued that a significant portion of value stocks’ 
superior performance is attributable to earning surprises (see De Bondt and Thaler, 1985; 
Lakonishok et al., 1994; La Porta, 1996; Chan et al., 2000, 2003; Chan and Lakonishok, 
2004; Charles et al., 2004). According to Dreman and Berry (1995) and Levis and 
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Liodakis (2001), positive and negative earnings surprises have an asymmetrical effect on 
the returns of value and growth stocks. Positive earning surprises have a 
disproportionately large positive impact on value stocks while negative surprises have a 
relatively benign effect on such stocks (see also Bauman and Miller, 1997). 
 
Furthermore, analysts and institutional investors may have their own reasons for 
gravitating toward growth stocks. Analysts have self-interest in recommending successful 
stocks to generate trading commissions and more investment banking business. 
Moreover, growth stocks are typically in ‘promising’ industries, and are thus easier to 
promote in terms of analyst reports and media coverage (Bhushan, 1989; and Jegadeesh 
et al., 2004). These considerations play into the career concerns of institutional money 
managers (Lakonishok et al., 1994). Another important factor is that most investors have 
shorter time horizons than are required for value strategies to consistently pay off (De 
Long et al., 1990; Shleifer and Vishny, 1990). In addition, institutional investors act in a 
fiduciary capacity. Pension fund trustees, in particular, are expected to behave as an 
“ordinary man of prudence”. This implies that they must go with the crowd (i.e. opt for 
glamour stocks. The result of all these considerations is that value stocks/glamour stocks 
become under-priced/overpriced relative to their fundamentals. Due to the limits of 
arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny (1997)), the mispricing patterns can persist over long 
periods of time.  
 
A third hypothesis that has been postulated for the superiority of the contrarian strategy is 
that the reported cross-sectional return differences is an artifact of the research design and 
the database used to conduct the study (Black, 1993; Kothari et al., 1995). Thus, the 
abnormal returns would be reduced or vanish if different methodology and data were 
used. Such researchers argue that the superior returns are the result of survivor biases in 
the selection of firms (Banz and Breen, 1986), look-ahead bias (Banz and Breen, 1986), 
and a collective data-snooping exercise by many researchers sifting through the same 
data (Lo and MacKinlay, 1990). Finally, the database is limited to a relatively short 
sample period (Davis, 1994). The data-snooping explanation has been controverted by 
Lakonishok et al. (1994), Davis (1994, 1996), Fama and French (1998), Bauman and 
Conover (1999), Bauman et al., (2001), and Chan and Lakonishok (2004) who used 
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databases that are free of survivorship bias and/or fresh data that previously have not 
been used for such analysis to confirm the superior performance of value strategy.   
 
Furthermore, two features of value investing distinguish it from other possible anomalies. 
According to Chan and Lakonishok (2004), many apparent violations of the efficient 
market hypothesis, such as day-of-the-week patterns in stock returns, lack a convincing 
logical basis and the anomalous pattern is merely a statistical fluke that has been 
uncovered through data mining. The value premium, however, can be tied to ingrained 
patterns of investor behavior or the incentives of professional investment managers.  
 
In view of the analogy between value stock and high income producing property 
(henceforth called value property), the features of the contrarian investment strategy may 
apply to property investment. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
a) value properties generate higher returns than growth properties; 
b) value property investment is riskier than growth property investment; 
c) investors naively extrapolate past performance into future expectations; and 
d) the returns of value and growth properties are mean-reverting. 
 
These hypotheses will be operationalized through statistical tests, and where possible, 
stochastic dominance test. 
 
Data Sourcing and Management 
A growth real estate investor prefers properties with a low initial yield to properties with 
high initial yield. The investor chooses to exchange immediate cash flows for higher 
future cash flows (in the form of potential capital appreciation and/or rental growth) that 
are worth more at the date of the purchase, depending on the investor’s opportunity cost 
of capital. On the other hand, a value property investor prefers to receive a high initial 
yield rather than to wait for future income or uncertain capital growth. The paper uses the 
Jones Lang Lasalle Real Estate Intelligence Service-Asia (JLL REIS-Asia), the Property 
Council of New Zealand, the Property Council of Australia and NCREIF property 
databases to classify 73 office property sub-markets, 52 industrial property sub-markets 
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and 48 retail property sub-markets into value/growth sub-markets on the bases of yields 
(see Appendix1), i.e. E/P ratio. The data for the office and industrial property markets are 
from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3 while the retail property market data are from 1992Q1 to 
2005Q3. 
 
 
The initial yields are measured in U.S. dollars. Decile portfolios are formed on the basis 
of the end-of-previous-quarter’s initial yield. The top decile of the sample with the 
highest initial yield is classified as value property (Vp) portfolio while the bottom decile 
with the lowest initial yield is classified as growth property (Gp). Each decile is treated as 
a portfolio composed of equally weighted properties. The portfolios are reformulated 
only at the end of each holding period. This system of classification is consistent with the 
finance literature (see for example, Chan et al. [1991] and Bauman et al. [1998, 2001]). 
 
The classification of the property sub-markets into Vp and Gp portfolios is followed by an 
examination of the relative performances of the portfolios. If there is evidence of a value 
premium in any of the sampled property sector markets, the underlying reasons behind 
the relative superiority of Vp will be discussed.  
 
 
The Contrarian Strategy Model  
 
The performances of both the value and growth properties for the office and industrial 
sectors are compared on a 5-year, 10-year, 15-year and entire holding-period (of up to 83 
quarters) horizons while those for the retail sector are compared on 5-year, 10-year and 
entire holding-period (of up to 55 quarters). Medium and long term investment horizons 
are the focus of analyses as real estate investors usually invest long (Ball, 1998). Periodic 
(i.e. quarter-by-quarter) return measure is used in the evaluation of the relative superiority 
of the performance of Vp and Gp portfolios. The periodic returns are quantified as simple 
holding period returns. Thus, the simple holding period returns are calculated for each 
quarter and compounded to obtain the multi-year holding-period (e.g. 5-year investment 
horizon) returns as defined in equation (1). 
       11...11 21  mt rrrr  (Levy, 1999),    (1) 
where 
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 r1, r2…rm = return for each quarter of the period m. 
 m             = number of quarters for the holding period.  
 
 Compared to simply adding the returns for all quarters of a given period, equation (1) is 
more accurate (Sharpe et al., 1998). The periodic quartile returns for each holding- period 
horizon are averaged across the full period of study to determine the time-weighted 
average return. Arithmetic mean is most widely used in forecasts of future expectations 
and in portfolio analysis (Geltner and Miller, 2001). Each value-growth spread (i.e. value 
premium) is then computed by subtracting the mean return on a Gp portfolio from that on 
the corresponding Vp portfolio. 
 
The pooled-variance t test and separate-variance t test are then used to determine whether 
there is a significant difference between the means of the Vp and Gp portfolios. If the p-
value is smaller than the conventional levels of significance (i.e. 0.05 and 0.10), the null 
hypothesis that the two means are equal will be rejected: 
 growthvalueH  :0   
 growthvalueH  :1  
 
The next step is to determine whether any difference in returns is a function of variation 
in risk, using a more direct evaluation of the risk-based explanation that focuses on the 
performance of the value and growth properties in ‘bad’ states of the world. Traditional 
measures of risk such as standard deviation of returns, risk-to-return ratio (i.e. coefficient 
of variation – CV) and return-to-risk ratio will be utilized.  
 
The Levene’s Test is used to test the equality of the variances for the value and growth 
properties:  
 growthvalueH
22
0 :    
 growthvalueH
22
1 :    
 
 Performance in ‘Bad’ States of the World  
According to Lakonishok et al. (1994), value strategies would be fundamentally riskier 
than glamour strategies if:  
i) they under-perform glamour strategies in some states of the world; and  
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ii) those are on average ‘bad’ states of the world, in which the marginal utility of wealth 
is high, making value strategies unattractive to risk-averse investors.  
 
Periods of severe stock market declines are used as a proxy for ‘bad’ states of the world. 
This is because they generally correspond to periods when aggregate wealth is low and 
thus the utility of an extra dollar is high. The approach of examining property 
performance during down markets also corresponds to the notion of downside risk that 
has gained popularity in the investment community (Chan and Lakonishok, 2004). If the 
above tests confirm the superiority of value properties, stochastic dominance will be used 
to ascertain the optimality of the value property investment strategy. 
 
Stochastic Dominance 
The most widely known and applied efficiency criterion for evaluating investments is the 
mean-variance model. An alternative approach is the stochastic dominance (SD) analysis, 
which has been employed in various areas of economics, finance and statistics (Levy, 1992; Al-
khazali, 2002; Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003). The efficacy and applicability of SD analysis, and its 
relative advantages over the mean-variance approach have been discussed and proven by 
several researchers including Hanoch and Levy (1969), Hadar and Russell (1969), Rothschild 
and Stiglitz (1970), Whitmore, 1970, Levy (1992), Al-khazali (2002) and Barrett and Donald 
(2003). According to Taylor and Yodder (1999), SD is a theoretically unimpeachable general 
model of portfolio choice that maximizes expected utility. It uses the entire probability density 
function rather than simply summarizing a distribution’s features as given by its statistical 
moments. 
 
Stochastic Dominance Criteria 
The SD rules are normally specified as first, second, and third degree SD criteria denoted by 
FSD, SSD, and TSD respectively (see Levy, 1992; Barrett and Donald, 2003; Barucci, 2003). 
There is also the nth degree SD. Given that F and G are the cumulative distribution functions of 
two mutually exclusive risky options X and Y, F dominates G (FDG) by FSD, SSD, and TSD, 
denoted by FD1G, FD2G, and FD3G, respectively, if and only if, 
    XGXF      for all X (FSD)   (2) 
      0  dttFtG
x
   for all X (SSD)   (3) 
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      0   

dtdtFtG
x
  for all X, and 
       TSDXEXE GF        (4) 
The FSD (also referred to as the General Efficiency Criterion – Levy and Sarnat, 1972) 
assumes that all investors prefer more wealth to less regardless of their attitude towards risk. 
The SSD is based on the economic notion that investors are risk averse while the TSD posits 
that investors exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion (Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003). A higher 
degree SD is required only if the preceding lower degree SD does not conclusively resolve the 
optimal choice problem. Thus, if FD1G, then for all values of x, F(x) ≤ G(x) or G(x) - F(x) ≥ 0. 
Since the expression cannot be negative, it follows that for all values of x, the following must 
also hold: 
      0  dttFtG
x
; that is, FD2G  (Levy and Sarnat, 1972; Levy, 1998) 
 
Furthermore, the SD rules and the relevant class of preferences Ui are related in the following 
way: 
FSD: )()()()( XUEXUEXXGXF GF    1Uu , (5) 
SSD:      XUEXUEXdttGdttF GF
x x
  )(   2Uu , (6) 
TSD:        XUEXUEXdtdtGdtdtF GF
x xx
       

 
      3Uu , and 
         XEXE GF  ,   (7) 
where iU = utility function class (i =1, 2, 3) 
 1U  includes all u with 0'u ; 
 2U  includes all u with 0'u and 0'' u ; and 
 3U  includes all u with 0'u , 0'' u  and 0''' u . 
In other words, a lower degree SD is embedded in a higher degree SD. The economic 
interpretation of the above rules for the family of all concave utility functions is that their 
fulfilment implies that  xUEF   xUEG  and  xEF    xEG ; i.e. the expected utility and 
return of the preferred option must be greater than the expected utility and return of the 
dominated option.  
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Empirical Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
Following the evaluation of the risk characteristics of the Vp and Gp portfolios, the next 
task is to investigate the relationship between the past, the forecasted, and the actual 
future growth rates. This relationship is largely consistent with the predictions of the 
extrapolation model. The essence of extrapolation is that investors are excessively 
optimistic about growth properties and excessively pessimistic about value properties. A 
direct test of extrapolation (Lakonishok et al. (1994)), then, is to look directly at the 
actual future rental income and capital growth rates of value and growth properties, and 
compare them to:  
 a)  past growth rates and  
 b)  expected growth rates as implied by the initial yields.  
 
If naïve extrapolation is established, the variance ratio test will be used to show that naïve 
extrapolation is a credible explanation to the relative superiority of the contrarian 
strategy. 
 
Variance Ratio Test 
The variance ratio, which measures the randomness of a return series, is calculated by 
dividing the variance of longer intervals’ returns by the variance of shorter intervals’ 
returns (for the same measurement period. The result is normalized to 1 by dividing it by 
the ratio of the longer to the shorter interval. The test assumes that if a return series 
follows a random walk, the variance of its k-differences should be k times the variance of 
its first difference (Poterba and Summers, 1988). 
 
Assuming that yt denotes a time series consisting of T observations, the variance ratio of 
the k-th difference is calculated as follows (see Lo and MacKinlay, 1988; Poterba and 
Summers, 1988; Belaire-Franch and Oppong, 2005): 
  
 
 
,
12
2

 k
kVR                                                                                          (8) 
where 
VR(k): is the variance ratio of the series k-th difference 
 k2 : is the unbiased estimator of 1/k of the variance of the series k-th difference 
 12 : is the variance of the first–differenced return series 
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k: is the number of the days of the base observations interval, or the difference   
interval. 
 
The estimator of the k-period difference,  k2 , is computed as: 
 k2 =  

 
T
kt
ktt kyy
T
ˆ...
1
1                                                          (9) 
where 



T
t
ty
T 1
1
ˆ ; while the unbiased estimator of variance of the first difference, 
 12 , is:  
 12 = )ˆ(
1
1


T
t
ty
T
                                                                             (10) 
A variance ratio greater than 1 suggests that the shorter-interval returns trend within the 
duration of the longer interval (i.e. the return series is positively serially correlated). 
Conversely, a variance ratio less than 1 implies that the return series is negatively serially 
correlated (i.e. the shorter-interval returns are mean reverting within the duration of the 
longer interval. 
 
 
Performance of the Contrarian Strategy  
 
Exhibits 1 to 4 clearly demonstrate the superiority of the contrarian strategy in each of the 
holding periods under consideration.  The value portfolio for each property sector 
outperformed the corresponding growth portfolio. The value industrial property portfolio, 
in particular, recorded 100% positive value-growth spread for all the investment 
formation horizons (Exhibits 1-4a). In other words, the value industrial property portfolio 
outperformed its growth counterpart in every holding period. The mean value/growth 
industrial portfolio returns for the 5, 10, 15 and more than 15 years holding periods are 
163.59%/40.77%, 405.55%/107.46%, 1023.36%/187.18% and 1992.29%/258.69% 
respectively (Exhibit 5 – for full details see Appendices B-1, C-1, D-1 and E-1). This 
implies that an investor who adopted the contrarian strategy over the more than 15-year 
holding period would have earned, on average, 1733.6% more on each dollar invested 
than the one who invested in glamour industrial properties over the same period. 
 
Exhibits 1-4 
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Similarly, the value retail property portfolio had spectacular performance by registering 
100% value-growth spread for the 10 and more than 10 years holding periods (Exhibits 2 
and 4a). Over the 5-year investment formation horizons, the value retail property 
portfolio outperformed its glamour counterpart in 35 of the 36 holding periods (Exhibit 
1). The mean value/growth retail property portfolio returns for the 5, 10 and more than 10 
years holding period are 201.54%/65.62%, 810.85%/143.7% and 980.84%/203.76% 
respectively (Exhibit 5 – for full details see Appendices B-2, C-2 and F). 
 
 
 
Glamour office property portfolio did better than its industrial and retail counterparts. 
However, the better performance was nothing compared to the value office property 
portfolio. The value office property portfolio outperformed the growth office property 
portfolio in 39 out of the 61 five-year holding periods. In other words, the growth 
portfolio outperformed the value portfolio in 22 (out of the 61) investment formation 
periods between 1994Q1 and 1999Q2 (Exhibit 1 – for full details, see Appendix B-3). 
However, the superiority of the contrarian strategy is evident over the longer investment 
horizons (Exhibits 2-4). Over the 10-year investment horizon, the value office portfolio 
outperformed its growth counterpart in 36 0f the 41 formation periods (Exhibit 2; also 
Appendix C-3). Furthermore, the superior performance of the contrarian strategy is 
attested by the 100% positive value-growth spread for the 15 and more than 15 years 
formation periods (Exhibits 3 and 4; also Appendices D-3 and E-3). The mean return 
value/growth office property portfolio returns for 5, 10, 15 and more than 15 years 
holding period are 102.6%/35.29%, 275.12%/66.05%, 944.65%/96.26% and 
1929.81%/125.75% respectively (Exhibit 5). Thus, a dollar invested in value office 
property portfolio over the entire investment horizon, would have earned, on average, 
1804.06% more than a dollar invested in growth office property portfolio.  It is worth 
noting that the differences between the mean returns for both portfolios (i.e. the value 
premium) are statistically significant at both the 0.01 and 0.05 levels (Exhibit 6a). 
 
Exhibit 6a & 6b 
 
The relative superiority of the value portfolios is confirmed by the results of stochastic 
dominance test presented in Exhibits 7-9 
Exhibits 7-9 
Exhibit 5 
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Exhibits 7-9 clearly demonstrates that VpD1Gp for all the holding periods under 
consideration – i.e. the value portfolios are the most efficient (and therefore the optimal) 
choice. This implies that value portfolios stochastically dominate growth portfolios in the 
first, second and third order. In other words, the value portfolios statistically 
prognosticated a higher probability of success than the growth portfolios. For example, 
Exhibit 8c shows that there was a 60% and 0% probability that the 5-year holding period 
return for value and growth portfolios respectively was greater than or equal to 200%. 
Thus, value portfolio investment should have been preferable to both risk averters and 
risk lovers (Kjetsaa and Kieff, 2003; Levy and Sarnat, 1972). 
 
Is the Superior Performance of Contrarian Strategy a Compensation for Higher Risk? 
 
According to the traditional school of thought (see literature review), the superiority of 
the contrarian strategy is a compensation for higher systematic risk (i.e. higher return is a 
reward for higher risk). If the value strategy is fundamentally riskier, it should under-
perform the growth strategy during undesirable/bad states of the world – i.e. times of 
severe market decline when the marginal utility of consumption is high (Lakonishok et 
al., 1994). This section is therefore aimed at ascertaining if there is any synchrony 
between “value” underperformance and “bad” state of the world. Furthermore, traditional 
measures of risk (i.e. standard deviation) and risk-adjusted performance indicator (i.e. 
coefficient of variation) are used to compare “value” and growth strategies.  
 
Exhibits 1-4 show that the value strategy (industrial and retail sectors) virtually never 
under-performed the growth strategy in any holding period. It is the value office portfolio 
that underperformed “growth” between 1994Q1 and 1999Q2 (5-year holding period), and 
1991Q1and 1992Q3 (10-year holding period). Apart from 1997-1999 (the period of 
South-East Asian economic crisis), the periods of “value” underperformance do not 
coincide with severe market declines. As far as the industrial and retail sectors are 
concerned, there is no underperformance of the value portfolios to be associated with 
severe market declines as defined by some pay-off relevant factor.  
 
The performance of the value and growth properties in four states of the world (i.e. Worst, 
Next Worst, Next Best, and Best 20 quarters) based on Datastream Indices for the Pacific 
Basin Real Estate Stock Market from 1985Q1 to 2005Q3 (Exhibit 10) is presented in 
Exhibit 11. After matching the quarterly returns for the growth and value portfolios with 
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the changes in the real estate stock market return, the mean value-growth spread in each 
state is reported together with the corresponding t-statistics for the test that the difference 
in returns is equal to zero (Exhibit 11), i.e. 
  
0:
0:


growthvalueo
growthvalueo
H
H


 
  
Exhibits 10 & 11 
 
Exhibit 11 shows that the value strategy did notably better than the growth strategy in all 
the 4 states of the world (industrial sector) except the best state of the world (office and 
retail sectors). However, these “value” underperformances are not statistically significant.  
The null hypothesis is rejected for all 4 states of the world (industrial sector), the “Worst” 
and “Next Worst” (office), and “Worst” and “Next Best” states of the world to conclude 
that there is statistical difference between the means of the two populations. It is evident 
from Exhibit 11 that the superior performance of the value strategy was skewed towards 
negative market return months rather than positive market return months. The evidence 
indicates that there are no significant traces of a conventional asset pricing equilibrium in 
which the higher returns on the value strategy are compensation for higher systematic 
risk.  
 
The volatility of the portfolios’ returns during the period of study is presented in Exhibit 
5. The results show that value portfolios recorded higher standard deviation of returns 
than growth portfolios for all the holding periods and for the three property sectors.  The 
results presented in Exhibit 6b indicate that the higher value portfolio standard deviations 
are significantly different, at the 0.01 level, from those of the growth properties. 
However, since the mean returns and variances of the two portfolios are different, the 
coefficient of variation (CV) is a more appropriate risk measure for comparison. The CVs 
in Exhibit 5 imply that the industrial and office sectors value portfolios were safer than 
the growth portfolios for all the holding periods except the more than 15-year holding 
period. Furthermore, the retail value portfolio was safer (based on CV) than its growth 
counterpart in only the 5-year holding periods – It was riskier than the retail growth 
portfolio in the remaining two holding periods (Exhibit 5). However, since value 
portfolios stochastically dominate growth portfolios in all the holding periods (exhibits 7-
9), the latter is riskier than the former (Biswas, 1997). Hence, a risk model based on 
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differences in standard deviation alone may not be a credible explanation for the superior 
performance of value properties.  
 
Post-Model Estimation – A Test of the Extrapolation Model  
 
The paper provides empirical evidence to verify whether excessive extrapolation and 
expectational errors characterize growth and value strategies. First, the study period is 
divided into two: past (pre-portfolio formation) and future (post-formation) performances 
(see Panels B and C respectively of Exhibits 12-14). Exhibits 12-14 present some 
descriptive characteristics of the growth and value portfolios with respect to their initial 
yields, past growth rates, and future growth rates. Panel A of Exhibits 12-14 reveals that 
the value portfolios had higher initial yields than growth portfolios. This is supposed to 
portend lower expected growth rates for value properties. Panel B shows that, using 
several measures of past growth, including rental income and capital value, the growth 
portfolio performance for each sector (in relation to rental income) and for the industrial 
and retail sectors (relative to capital value) grew faster than the value portfolios over the 
pre- portfolio formulation period. Panel C shows that over the subsequent post-
formulation years, the relative growth of rental income and capital value for growth 
properties was generally quite below expectation.  
 
Exhibit 12-14 
 
Recall that the Gordon’s formula (Gordon and Shapiro (1956)) can be rewritten as 
dgR
P
I
k pNp 





  , where pk  is the initial yield for property, I is the current rental 
income, P is the market price, NR  is the required nominal return, and ( dg p  ) is the 
rental growth for actual, depreciating properties. These formulae literally imply that, 
holding discount rates constant, the differences in expected rental growth rates can be 
directly calculated from differences in initial yields. Since the assumptions behind these 
simple formulae are restrictive (e.g. constant growth rates, etc.), the paper does not 
calculate exact estimates of the differences in expected rental growth rates between value 
and growth portfolios. Instead, the paper seeks to ascertain whether the large differences 
in initial yields between value and growth properties can be justified by the differences in 
future rental growth rates.  
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Panel B of Exhibits 12-14 reveal that the average quarterly growth rate for rental income 
for the glamour portfolio was 20.43% compared to -1.47% (industrial), 14.36% compared 
to 0.56% (office) and 17.40% compared to -1.87% (retail) for the value portfolio over the 
pre-portfolio formation period.  
 
Every dollar invested in the value portfolio in 1994Q2 (office), 1994Q3 (industrial) and 
1997Q4 (retail) had a claim to 8.57, 5.16 and 12.22 cents of the then existing 
corresponding rental income while a dollar invested in the growth portfolio was a claim 
to 1.69, 2.05 and 1.75 cents of the rental income (Panel A of Exhibits 12-14). Ignoring 
any difference in required rates of return, the large differences in initial yields have to be 
justified by an expectation of higher rental growth rates for glamour than value portfolios 
over a period of time. Thus, the expected rental income for the growth portfolio must be 
higher than the value portfolio at some future date. Accordingly, investors would like to 
know the number of quarters it would take for the rental income per dollar invested in the 
growth portfolios (0.0169, 0.0205 and 0.0175) to equate the rental income of the value 
portfolio (0.0857, 0.0516 and 0.1222), assuming that the differences in past rental income 
growth rates would persist. It would take approximately 26 years (office), 6 years 
(industrial) and 21 years retail) for such equalization to occur (see Exhibit 15). Note that 
this equality is based on a flow basis, not on a present-value basis which would require an 
even longer time period over which glamour properties should experience superior 
growth. 
Exhibit 15 
 
Unfortunately, a comparison of Panels B and C (Exhibits 12-14) show that the relatively 
higher expected future growth (implied by the higher growth rate in the pre-formation 
period) in the glamour portfolios during the post-formation period was a far cry from 
reality. The actual post-formation rental growth rate for glamour portfolios plummeted by 
58.49% from 14.36% to 5.96% (office), 91.39% from 20.43% to 1.76% (industrial), and 
79.02% from 17.4% to 3.65% (retail) per quarter. Alternatively, the post-formation rental 
growth rate for the value portfolios increased by 8.93% from -0.56% to -0.51% (office), 
197.28% from -1.47% to 1.43% (industrial) and 100.53% from -1.87% to 0.01%. These 
results are consistent with the extrapolation model. Contrarian/glamour investors were 
pleasantly/unpleasantly surprised by the post formation portfolio results. Rental is, 
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however, a portion of portfolio performance. Capital value is an important portion of a 
portfolios performance and thus, must be analyzed in relation to the extrapolation model.  
 
During the pre-formation period, the capital value growth rates for the glamour 
portfolios, -1.21% (industrial) and 2.6% (retail) were higher than those for value 
portfolios, -7.45% (industrial) and 0.21% (retail). The capital value growth rate for the 
office glamour portfolio (-2.14%), in contradistinction, is lower than office value 
portfolio (6.99%) during the pre-formation period (Exhibits 12-14). The results in 
Exhibits 12-14 reveal that while the capital value growth rate the glamour industrial 
portfolio increase by 108.26% from -1.21% to 0.10%, that for the value industrial 
portfolio increased by 165.5% from -7.45% to 4.88% per quarter during the post-
formation period. Moreover, the capital value growth rate for the retail glamour portfolio 
declined by 12.69% from 2.6% to 2.27% while that for the value portfolio increased by 
238.1% from 0.21% to 0.71% per quarter in the post-formation period.  Once again, the 
results are consistent with the extrapolation model. 
 
However, the results for the office portfolio are inconsistent with the extrapolation model. 
The capital value growth rate for the glamour office portfolio increased by 156.54% from 
-2.14% to 1.21% while that of the corresponding value portfolio declined by 134.48% 
from 6.99% to -2.41% per quarter. The pertinent question that needs to be addressed at 
this juncture is whether, given the post-formation performance of capital value growth 
rates for the industrial and office portfolios, the glamour portfolios can outperform the 
value portfolios at some time in the future. This is addressed via a mean reversion 
analysis. 
 
Variance Ratio Test 
The results of the variance ratio tests are presented in Exhibit 16. The returns for both 
glamour and value portfolios for the three property sectors display mean reversion at long 
horizons.  However, the office glamour portfolio returns exhibit positive serial correlation 
over investment horizons of up to 10 years (40 quarters)  while the office value portfolio 
display negative serial correlation virtually over all the holding periods. This explains 
why the office glamour portfolio outperformed its value counterpart in 22 of the 61 5-
year holding periods (Exhibit 1) as well as 5 of the 41 10-year holding periods (Exhibit 
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2). On the average, however, the value strategy outperformed the glamour strategy over 
the 5 and 10-year holding periods when the glamour portfolio displayed return inertia. 
   
 
As far as the industrial sector is concerned, both portfolios display mean reversion in all 
the holding periods under consideration. This is also true of the retail sector except that 
the retail value portfolio exhibit positive serial correlation for holding periods between 5 
and 10 years. These results imply that the superior performance of the contrarian strategy 
is not a flash in the pan – It will persist in future years. 
 
 
Conclusion 
The paper set out to investigate the comparative advantage(s) of the value and growth 
investment strategies to ascertain the sustainability of the superior performance (if any) of 
the contrarian strategy. The results of the study indicate that value portfolios for all three 
property sectors out-performed (in both absolute, and in most cases, risk-adjusted bases) 
growth portfolios over all the holding periods under consideration. A dollar invested in 
the value portfolio over 10 years, on the average, earned 209.07% (office), 298.09% 
(industrial) and 647.15% (retail) more than a dollar invested in the corresponding growth 
portfolios. Similarly, a dollar invested in the value portfolio over the entire period of 
study earned, on average, 1804.06% (office), 1733.61% (industrial) and 771.08% (retail) 
more than a similar investment in the growth portfolio.  The difference between the 
performances of the value and the growth portfolios are statistically significant at the 0.01 
level. Thus, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the mean returns for 
the two portfolios is rejected.   
 
Furthermore, the superior performances of value portfolios occurred in almost all the four 
“states of the world”. The superior performance is not a compensation for higher risk as 
measured by the coefficient of variation (CV) for investment horizons of up to 5 years 
(retail) and 15 years (office and industrial). These findings are consistent with the 
contrarian strategy in finance. It must be noted, however, that the superior performance of 
the contrarian strategy for investment horizons of more than 5 years (retail) and 15 years 
(office and industrial) could be a compensation for higher risk as measured by the CV. 
Notwithstanding this caveat, the relative superiority of the value portfolio for each sector 
Exhibit 16 
 23 
and holding period is confirmed by stochastic dominance test, which indicates that the 
value strategy is the optimal choice for both risk averters and risk lovers. In addition, the 
variance ratio test reveals that returns for both value and growth property portfolios 
exhibit mean reversion at long horizons. This means that the superior performance of the 
contrarian strategy is sustainable. The above results are consistent with the finance 
literature. 
 
This consistency cannot be attributed to data snooping as the studies in the finance 
literature are based on different data. The findings imply that high initial yield office, 
industrial and retail portfolios in the sample outperformed low yield counterparts during 
the period under investigation. If the results can be generalized in any way, one may 
safely conclude that property investors should seriously consider contrarian real estate 
investment if they want to improve the performance of their portfolios. 
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Exhibit 1a: Composition of Decile Portfolios (1994 Q2 to 1999 Q2) 
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Auckland CBD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 4 
Auckland Non-CBD 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Bangkok CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 
Beijing CBD                                 1 2 2 2 
HK Central 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK Wanchai 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 4 
HK Tsimshatsui 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK East                                         
Jakarta CBD 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 
KLCC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 
KL DC 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Makati CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Seoul CBD                                         
Seoul Yoido CBD                                         
Seoul Gangnam CBD                                         
Shanghai Puxi 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 
Shanghai Pudong                 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 
Raffles Place 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Shenton Way                 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Marina Bay                                         
Tokyo CBD                          3 4 4 4 4 3 4 3 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 1b: Composition of Decile Portfolios (1999 Q2 to 2004 Q2) 
  
9
9
Q
2
-9
9
Q
3
 
Q
3
-Q
4
 
9
9
Q
4
-0
0
Q
1
 
Q
1
-Q
2
 
Q
2
-Q
3
 
Q
3
-Q
4
 
0
0
Q
4
-0
1
Q
1
 
Q
1
-Q
2
 
Q
2
-Q
3
 
Q
3
-Q
4
 
0
1
Q
4
-0
2
Q
1
 
Q
1
-Q
2
 
Q
2
-Q
3
 
Q
3
-Q
4
 
0
2
Q
4
-0
3
Q
1
 
Q
1
-Q
2
 
Q
2
-Q
3
 
Q
3
-Q
4
 
0
3
Q
4
-0
4
Q
1
 
Q
1
-Q
2
 
Auckland CBD 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Auckland Non-CBD 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Bangkok CBD 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 
Beijing CBD 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 
HK Central 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 4 4 4 3 3 
HK Wanchai 3 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
HK Tsimshatsui 2 3 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
HK East 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Jakarta CBD 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 
KLCC 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
KL DC 3 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Makati CBD 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Seoul CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 
Seoul Yoido CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 
Seoul Gangnam CBD   1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shanghai Puxi 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Shanghai Pudong 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Raffles Place 4 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 3 
Shenton Way 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 4 
Marina Bay           3 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3 4 4 
Tokyo CBD  4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 30 
Exhibit 2: Median Rental-to-Price Ratio 
  Quartiles 
  1 2 3 4 
Time Period Value     Growth 
          
94Q1 to 94Q2 10.13% 9.04% 5.40% 4.23% 
94Q2 to 94Q3 10.20% 8.88% 5.25% 4.27% 
94Q3 to 94Q4 10.21% 8.68% 5.12% 4.31% 
94Q4 to 95Q1 10.27% 8.53% 5.01% 4.24% 
95Q1 to 95Q2 9.80% 8.46% 4.80% 4.17% 
95Q2 to 95Q3 9.96% 8.27% 4.84% 4.20% 
95Q3 to 95Q4 10.08% 8.08% 4.87% 4.22% 
95Q4 to 96Q1 10.24% 7.86% 5.00% 3.97% 
96Q1 to 96Q2 11.61% 7.65% 5.13% 3.94% 
96Q2 to 96Q3 11.01% 7.59% 4.95% 3.90% 
96Q3 to 96Q4 10.37% 7.46% 4.74% 3.93% 
96Q4 to 97Q1 9.75% 7.46% 4.26% 3.78% 
97Q1 to 97Q2 9.34% 7.39% 4.17% 3.51% 
97Q2 to 97Q3 9.48% 7.35% 4.24% 3.60% 
97Q3 to 97Q4 9.65% 7.33% 4.56% 3.64% 
97Q4 to 98Q1 9.83% 7.04% 4.46% 3.54% 
98Q1 to 98Q2 10.37% 7.52% 4.61% 3.58% 
98Q2 to 98Q3 9.66% 7.50% 4.73% 3.64% 
98Q3 to 98Q4 9.10% 7.54% 4.78% 3.72% 
98Q4 to 99Q1 9.26% 6.90% 4.73% 3.81% 
99Q1 to 99Q2 10.05% 6.51% 5.20% 4.00% 
99Q2 to 99Q3 10.41% 6.56% 5.86% 4.14% 
99Q3 to 99Q4 10.73% 6.40% 5.42% 4.03% 
99Q4 to 00Q1 11.88% 6.34% 4.87% 3.91% 
00Q1 to 00Q2 13.69% 7.32% 5.28% 4.02% 
00Q2 to 00Q3 13.05% 7.47% 5.58% 4.17% 
00Q3 to 00Q4 12.44% 7.66% 5.66% 4.32% 
00Q4 to 01Q1 11.54% 8.28% 5.71% 4.47% 
01Q1 to 01Q2 11.01% 8.18% 5.70% 4.40% 
01Q2 to 01Q3 10.03% 7.69% 5.72% 4.36% 
01Q3 to 01Q4 10.04% 7.75% 5.66% 4.30% 
01Q4 to 02Q1 9.57% 8.19% 5.43% 4.03% 
02Q1 to 02Q2 9.26% 8.41% 5.53% 3.91% 
02Q2 to 02Q3 9.28% 8.41% 5.39% 4.06% 
02Q3 to 02Q4 9.45% 8.25% 5.35% 3.90% 
02Q4 to 03Q1 8.85% 7.86% 5.44% 3.92% 
03Q1 to 03Q2 9.04% 7.78% 5.17% 3.93% 
03Q2 to 03Q3 8.98% 8.01% 4.71% 3.68% 
03Q3 to 03Q4 8.96% 8.20% 5.33% 3.93% 
03Q4 to 04Q1 8.69% 7.86% 5.32% 4.07% 
          
First-quarter 1994 to First-quarter 2004: 
Mean 10.69% 7.67% 5.21% 3.76% 
Minimum 7.42% 5.48% 3.98% 1.86% 
Median 9.88% 7.66% 5.11% 3.97% 
Maximum 22.32% 9.42% 7.13% 5.11% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 3: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (1-quarter Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread between 
1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 94Q3 17.98% 9.55% 10.52% 9.37% 8.62% 
94Q3 - 94Q4 17.64% 9.29% 10.26% 9.02% 8.62% 
94Q4 - 95Q1 17.41% 9.15% 10.02% 7.94% 9.47% 
95Q1 - 95Q2 13.10% 7.03% 0.49% 5.80% 7.30% 
95Q2 - 95Q3 12.80% 8.51% 1.32% 3.87% 8.93% 
95Q3 - 95Q4 12.52% 8.46% 1.51% 4.03% 8.49% 
95Q4 - 96Q1 12.19% 8.39% 0.89% 3.50% 8.70% 
96Q1 - 96Q2 11.81% 6.80% 14.09% 7.55% 4.26% 
96Q2 - 96Q3 11.31% 6.73% 12.79% 7.37% 3.95% 
96Q3 - 96Q4 10.77% 6.58% 10.62% 8.01% 2.75% 
96Q4 - 97Q1 10.25% 6.46% 9.95% 7.86% 2.39% 
97Q1 - 97Q2 3.11% 2.36% 3.50% -0.39% 3.50% 
97Q2 - 97Q3 5.50% -2.66% 2.66% -0.49% 5.99% 
97Q3 - 97Q4 5.93% -5.73% 2.48% -0.62% 6.55% 
97Q4 - 98Q1 5.46% -8.69% 0.83% 0.63% 4.83% 
98Q1 - 98Q2 3.32% 5.16% -5.00% -1.30% 4.62% 
98Q2 - 98Q3 5.14% -0.39% -2.75% -6.17% 11.30% 
98Q3 - 98Q4 7.11% -1.37% -4.00% -8.15% 15.26% 
98Q4 - 99Q1 0.46% 2.17% -5.86% -9.65% 10.12% 
99Q1 - 99Q2 9.49% 4.22% 6.31% 4.25% 5.23% 
99Q2 - 99Q3 9.18% 1.99% 6.54% 3.63% 5.55% 
99Q3 - 99Q4 5.57% 5.37% 4.65% 4.30% 1.27% 
99Q4 - 00Q1 11.58% 6.12% 3.85% 4.09% 7.50% 
00Q1 - 00Q2 14.39% 10.61% 5.33% 2.88% 11.51% 
00Q2 - 00Q3 19.66% 8.86% 5.73% 2.73% 16.93% 
00Q3 - 00Q4 14.78% 8.14% 6.90% 3.18% 11.60% 
00Q4 - 01Q1 14.65% 6.12% 7.29% 3.32% 11.32% 
01Q1 - 01Q2 11.83% 6.18% 3.77% -0.30% 12.13% 
01Q2 - 01Q3 12.15% 5.09% 4.74% -0.16% 12.31% 
01Q3 - 01Q4 18.03% 7.59% 2.06% 0.46% 17.58% 
01Q4 - 02Q1 7.25% 7.98% 0.24% 0.21% 7.03% 
02Q1 - 02Q2 10.10% 8.28% 3.80% 0.85% 9.25% 
02Q2 - 02Q3 13.51% 8.43% 2.72% 2.18% 11.33% 
02Q3 - 02Q4 17.22% 7.57% 0.85% -0.21% 17.43% 
02Q4 - 03Q1 5.98% 8.31% 2.71% 1.35% 4.63% 
03Q1 - 03Q2 11.05% 8.35% 3.65% 0.14% 10.91% 
03Q2 - 03Q3 11.02% 7.23% 0.03% -4.31% 15.33% 
03Q3 - 03Q4 14.63% 9.15% 4.36% 4.46% 10.17% 
03Q4 - 04Q1 7.76% 6.67% 9.01% 6.95% 0.81% 
04Q1 - 04Q2 13.90% 10.16% 21.92% 8.40% 5.50% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean Return 10.94% 5.76% 4.52% 2.41% 8.52% 
Mean 
Volatility      4.62% 4.29% 5.39% 4.48% 4.36% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 4: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (3-year Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread between 1 
& 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 97Q2 309.06% 139.56% 104.67% 121.85% 187.21% 
94Q3 - 97Q3 246.04% 123.22% 83.78% 110.43% 135.61% 
94Q4 - 97Q4 187.34% 107.60% 65.47% 99.69% 87.65% 
95Q1 - 98Q1 131.40% 80.49% 60.75% 90.70% 40.70% 
95Q2 - 98Q2 122.39% 74.88% 66.41% 53.18% 69.21% 
95Q3 - 98Q3 113.34% 57.18% 55.31% 40.17% 73.17% 
95Q4 - 98Q4 104.36% 39.13% 41.54% 25.68% 78.69% 
96Q1 - 99Q1 95.31% 20.26% 26.87% 11.14% 84.17% 
96Q2 - 99Q2 97.72% 23.25% 19.18% -0.27% 97.99% 
96Q3 - 99Q3 87.25% 26.12% 12.95% -4.40% 91.65% 
96Q4 - 99Q4 77.44% 28.79% 7.31% -8.36% 85.80% 
97Q1 - 00Q1 68.16% 31.38% 28.21% -26.78% 94.94% 
97Q2 - 00Q2 81.27% 29.33% 35.49% -22.67% 103.94% 
97Q3 - 00Q3 69.47% 55.28% 17.74% -2.71% 72.19% 
97Q4 - 00Q4 67.74% 72.51% 8.93% 12.25% 55.49% 
98Q1 - 01Q1 66.46% 100.90% 13.90% 15.33% 51.13% 
98Q2 - 01Q2 103.27% 77.53% 27.73% 12.84% 90.43% 
98Q3 - 01Q3 84.74% 111.82% 47.20% 9.87% 74.87% 
98Q4 - 01Q4 104.47% 114.89% 44.91% 28.07% 76.40% 
99Q1 - 02Q1 134.21% 112.75% 68.01% 30.31% 103.89% 
99Q2 - 02Q2 133.09% 119.53% 78.70% 21.75% 111.34% 
99Q3 - 02Q3 280.07% 145.96% 78.46% 26.09% 253.97% 
99Q4 - 02Q4 319.09% 142.27% 80.25% 20.71% 298.38% 
00Q1 - 03Q1 295.97% 143.36% 81.64% 17.55% 278.42% 
00Q2 - 03Q2 319.80% 109.76% 83.91% 16.04% 303.76% 
00Q3 - 03Q3 292.67% 97.43% 63.90% 14.40% 278.27% 
00Q4 - 03Q4 287.24% 88.91% 69.30% 15.80% 271.44% 
01Q1 - 04Q1 254.47% 98.17% 71.67% 18.10% 236.37% 
01Q2 - 04Q2 258.10% 141.31% 81.79% 24.41% 233.68% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic Mean Return 165.24% 86.67% 52.62% 26.59% 138.65% 
Mean Volatility      93.88% 41.37% 27.81% 36.42% 87.12% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 5: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (5-year Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread 
between 1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 99Q2 445.21% 138.18% 30.80% 145.28% 299.93% 
94Q3 - 99Q3 389.81% 137.46% 26.75% 130.82% 258.99% 
94Q4 - 99Q4 339.59% 136.48% 22.62% 117.04% 222.55% 
95Q1 - 00Q1 293.56% 115.15% 29.92% 105.61% 187.95% 
95Q2 - 00Q2 268.45% 133.13% 76.77% 46.52% 221.93% 
95Q3 - 00Q3 242.26% 131.17% 82.91% 50.09% 192.18% 
95Q4 - 00Q4 209.90% 129.00% 89.69% 50.53% 159.37% 
96Q1 - 01Q1 184.79% 127.10% 98.67% 51.02% 133.77% 
96Q2 - 01Q2 186.64% 127.66% 78.65% 30.18% 156.46% 
96Q3 - 01Q3 171.95% 128.63% 70.02% 17.61% 154.34% 
96Q4 - 01Q4 167.95% 129.89% 57.44% 7.92% 160.03% 
97Q1 - 02Q1 163.70% 130.33% 61.92% -9.49% 173.20% 
97Q2 - 02Q2 193.52% 127.19% 63.20% -6.73% 200.25% 
97Q3 - 02Q3 191.43% 167.40% 47.56% 6.36% 185.07% 
97Q4 - 02Q4 196.85% 201.60% 29.38% 18.32% 178.53% 
98Q1 - 03Q1 205.17% 258.15% 29.32% 20.38% 184.79% 
98Q2 - 03Q2 283.25% 226.23% 48.27% 14.44% 268.81% 
98Q3 - 03Q3 255.19% 291.14% 56.88% 13.35% 241.84% 
98Q4 - 03Q4 307.76% 292.00% 63.85% 34.13% 273.63% 
99Q1 - 04Q1 373.71% 287.46% 97.79% 52.72% 320.98% 
99Q2 - 04Q2 383.11% 320.23% 146.84% 52.41% 330.70% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Return 
259.71% 177.88% 62.35% 45.17% 214.54% 
Mean 
Volatility      
85.17% 69.88% 30.79% 44.36% 57.92% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 6: Returns for Quartile Portfolios (Entire Holding-Period) 
  Initial Yield Quartiles   
Time Period 1 2 3 4 Spread 
between 1 & 4   Value     Growth 
94Q2 - 04Q2 2117.48% 956.51% 258.35% 274.12% 1843.36% 
94Q3 - 04Q2 1779.51% 864.43% 224.24% 242.08% 1537.43% 
94Q4 - 04Q2 1497.66% 782.46% 194.08% 213.78% 1283.88% 
95Q1 - 04Q2 1260.77% 492.04% 275.80% 190.70% 1070.08% 
95Q2 - 04Q2 1103.14% 644.82% 199.32% 159.70% 943.44% 
95Q3 - 04Q2 966.66% 586.42% 195.41% 150.02% 816.63% 
95Q4 - 04Q2 847.97% 532.88% 191.02% 140.35% 707.62% 
96Q1 - 04Q2 744.94% 483.87% 188.46% 132.23% 612.70% 
96Q2 - 04Q2 707.78% 446.70% 152.84% 85.31% 622.46% 
96Q3 - 04Q2 625.68% 412.20% 173.47% 48.27% 577.41% 
96Q4 - 04Q2 555.15% 380.60% 147.21% 37.27% 517.88% 
97Q1 - 04Q2 494.23% 351.45% 110.07% 33.10% 461.13% 
97Q2 - 04Q2 434.44% 389.05% 106.75% 33.63% 400.82% 
97Q3 - 04Q2 408.10% 400.93% 106.70% 32.57% 375.53% 
97Q4 - 04Q2 379.64% 431.40% 87.50% 42.00% 337.64% 
98Q1 - 04Q2 354.79% 481.95% 85.96% 41.10% 313.69% 
98Q2 - 04Q2 466.08% 344.71% 99.66% 41.69% 424.39% 
98Q3 - 04Q2 392.97% 386.25% 123.28% 38.52% 354.45% 
98Q4 - 04Q2 402.30% 353.40% 115.04% 63.47% 338.83% 
99Q1 - 04Q2 428.94% 318.86% 145.60% 67.98% 360.96% 
            
Quarter Performance for Portfolios in the Period 94Q2 to 04Q2: 
Arithmetic 
Mean 
Return 
798.41% 502.05% 159.04% 103.39% 695.02% 
Mean 
Volatility      
510.25% 180.08% 55.94% 78.41% 434.91% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 7: Tests for Equality of Means 
Holding Period 
Value-
Growth 
Spread 
t test 
Test 
statisic t 
p-
value 
95% Confidence Interval 
Quarterly 8.52% 
Pooled-
variance 
8.38 0.000 (0.0650 , 0.1055) 
    
Separate-
variance 
8.38 0.000 (0.0650 , 0.1055) 
3 Years 138.65% 
Pooled-
variance 
7.41 0.000 (1.0119 , 1.7611) 
    
Separate-
variance 
7.41 0.000 (1.0072 , 1.7657) 
5 Years 214.54% 
Pooled-
variance 
10.24 0.000 (1.7218 , 2.5689) 
    
Separate-
variance 
10.24 0.000 (1.7174 , 2.5734) 
Entire Period 695.02% 
Pooled-
variance 
6.15 0.000 (3.1336 , 6.1332) 
    
Separate-
variance 
6.15 0.000 (3.1108 , 6.1560) 
Source: Authors’ Computations  
 
Exhibit 10a: Four States of the World 
Period Classification Period Classification Period Classification Period Classification 
94Q2 - 
94Q3 
NW10 
96Q4 - 
97Q1 
NB10 
99Q2 - 
99Q3 
NW10 
01Q4 - 
02Q1 
NB10 
94Q3 - 
94Q4 
NB10 
97Q1 - 
97Q2 
NW10 
99Q3 - 
99Q4 
W10 
02Q1 - 
02Q2 
NB10 
94Q4 - 
95Q1 
W10 
97Q2 - 
97Q3 
B10 
99Q4 - 
00Q1 
B10 
02Q2 - 
02Q3 
W10 
95Q1 - 
95Q2 
B10 
97Q3 - 
97Q4 
W10 
00Q1 - 
00Q2 
W10 
02Q3 - 
02Q4 
NW10 
95Q2 - 
95Q3 
NB10 
97Q4 - 
98Q1 
W10 
00Q2 - 
00Q3 
NB10 
02Q4 - 
03Q1 
NW10 
95Q3 - 
95Q4 
NW10 
98Q1 - 
98Q2 
B10 
00Q3 - 
00Q4 
NW10 
03Q1 - 
03Q2 
W10 
95Q4 - 
96Q1 
B10 
98Q2 - 
98Q3 
W10 
00Q4 - 
01Q1 
NB10 
03Q2 - 
03Q3 
B10 
96Q1 - 
96Q2 
NB10 
98Q3 - 
98Q4 
B10 
01Q1 - 
01Q2 
W10 
03Q3 - 
03Q4 
B10 
96Q2 - 
96Q3 
NW10 
98Q4 - 
99Q1 
NB10 
01Q2 - 
01Q3 
NW10 
03Q4 - 
04Q1 
B10 
96Q3 - 
96Q4 
NB10 
99Q1 - 
99Q2 
B10 
01Q3 - 
01Q4 
W10 
04Q1 - 
04Q2 
NW10 
Source: Author's Computations 
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Exhibit 8a: Stochastic Dominance of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (Quarterly Holding 
Period)
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Exhibit 8a: Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (3-Year Holding Period)
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Exhibit 8c: Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (5-Year Holding 
Period)
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Exhibit 8d:Stochastic Dominance Analysis of Contrarian Real Estate Investment (>=5-Year Holding Period)
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Source: Authors 
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Exhibit 9: Pacific Basin Real Estate (Datastream)
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Exhibit 10b: Performance of Portfolios in Best and Worst Times 
        Tests for Equality of Means 
  Value Growth Spread t test Test statistic t 
p-
value 
Worst 10 quarters 10.83% 1.14% 9.69% Pooled-variance 4.92 0.000 
        Separate-variance 4.92 0.000 
Next Worst 10 Quarters 11.81% 3.66% 8.16% Pooled-variance 4.34 0.000 
        Separate-variance 4.34 0.001 
Next Best 10 Quarters 11.54% 3.38% 8.16% Pooled-variance 3.34 0.004 
        Separate-variance 3.34 0.004 
Best 10 Quarters 9.57% 1.48% 8.09% Pooled-variance 4.23 0.001 
        Separate-variance 4.23 0.001 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 11: Test for Equality of Variances  
Holding Period 
Test 
statistics 
p-
value 
95% Bonferroni confidence intervals Decision 
Value Growth α = 0.05 α = 0.01 
Quarterly 0.12 0.732 (0.0368 , 0.0616) (0.0357 , 0.0597) 
Do not 
reject 
Do not 
reject 
3 Years 15.33 0.000 (0.7217 , 1.3298) (0.2800 , 0.5158) Reject Reject 
5 Years 8.46 0.006 (0.6283 , 1.3022) (0.3272 , 0.6781) Reject Reject 
Entire Period 21.76 0.000 (3.7598 , 6.2919) (0.5298 , 0.8865) Reject Reject 
Source: Authors’ Computations  
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 12: Coefficient of Variation 
Holding Period 
Quartile 
Portfolio 
Standard 
deviation 
Mean 
Return 
Coefficient of 
Variation 
Return to 
Risk 
Quarterly Value 4.62% 10.94% 0.42 2.37 
  Growth 4.48% 2.41% 1.86 0.54 
3 Years Value 93.88% 165.24% 0.57 1.76 
  Growth 36.42% 26.59% 1.37 0.73 
5 Years Value 85.17% 259.71% 0.33 3.05 
  Growth 44.36% 45.17% 0.98 1.02 
Entire Period Value 510.25% 798.41% 0.64 1.56 
  Growth 78.41% 103.39% 0.76 1.32 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 13: Initial Yields, Past Performance, and Future Performance of Value and Glamour Properties 
Panel A: Initial Yields   Panel B: Past Performance 
      Value Growth       Value Growth 
1999 
Q1-
Q2 
Initial Yield 0.1005 0.0400 
  
    
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
1999 
Q2-
Q3 
Portfolio 
Composition 
Bangkok CBD Auckland CBD   1994 Q3 2.49% 1.29% 6.60% 9.65% 
Jakarta CBD Raffles Place     Q4 2.26% 0.79% 6.33% 8.37% 
KLCC Shenton Way   1995 Q1 2.14% 0.68% 5.13% 7.66% 
Makati CBD Tokyo CBD      Q2 0.00% 1.03% 2.41% 5.30% 
              Q3 -0.05% 1.28% 2.85% 5.38% 
              Q4 -0.03% 0.89% 3.30% 5.04% 
            1996 Q1 -0.07% 0.98% 2.90% 4.59% 
              Q2 -0.42% -0.72% 2.74% 2.27% 
              Q3 -0.47% -0.78% 2.62% 2.46% 
              Q4 -0.56% -1.19% 2.51% 2.38% 
            1997 Q1 -0.61% -0.91% 2.66% 2.35% 
              Q2 -7.88% -6.58% -2.39% -3.39% 
              Q3 -8.92% -7.12% -2.58% -3.64% 
              Q4 -10.38% -8.32% -2.77% -3.98% 
            1998 Q1 -12.58% -9.88% -2.91% -4.20% 
              Q2 -5.34% -4.35% -4.84% -2.41% 
              Q3 -6.17% -5.19% -5.87% -2.74% 
              Q4 -7.21% -5.30% -7.06% -3.10% 
            1999 Q1 -8.95% -6.44% -8.10% -3.39% 
              Q2 -0.43% -2.87% -0.11% 0.26% 
                        
            
Geometric 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
-3.27% -2.70% 0.08% 1.35% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
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Exhibit 13: Fundamental Variables, Past 
Performance, and Future Performance of Value 
and Glamour Properties 
Panel C: Future Performance 
    Value Growth 
    
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
Capital 
Growth 
Rental 
Growth 
1999 Q3 -0.47% -2.93% -0.33% 0.33% 
  Q4 -0.58% -3.11% -0.56% 0.18% 
2000 Q1 -0.62% -3.71% -0.66% 0.07% 
  Q2 -1.52% -1.55% -1.48% 6.03% 
  Q3 -2.67% -3.05% -1.36% 5.57% 
  Q4 -4.25% -5.93% -1.24% 5.20% 
2001 Q1 -3.39% -4.07% -0.71% 4.81% 
  Q2 -2.28% -1.93% -4.75% -2.28% 
  Q3 -2.64% -4.41% -4.69% -2.45% 
  Q4 0.39% -0.06% -4.98% -2.95% 
2002 Q1 -0.82% -0.48% -5.40% -3.28% 
  Q2 0.40% -1.20% -2.78% -1.26% 
  Q3 1.00% -1.04% -1.16% -0.90% 
  Q4 -1.97% -2.53% -2.79% -2.33% 
2003 Q1 0.53% 0.10% -1.64% -1.17% 
  Q2 0.54% -0.36% -3.39% -3.32% 
  Q3 2.38% 1.64% -4.29% -5.47% 
  Q4 2.72% 1.89% 1.07% -0.75% 
2004 Q1 1.69% 0.48% 1.96% 1.71% 
  Q2 3.50% 2.40% 2.02% 2.02% 
            
Geometric 
Average 
Growth 
Rate 
-0.42% -1.52% -1.88% -0.06% 
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
 
Exhibit 14: Growth of Rental Income Per Dollar (2nd Quarter 1999 = Year 0) 
Year 
Growth 
Portfolio 
Value 
Portfolio 
Year 
Growth 
Portfolio 
Value 
Portfolio 
0 0.0400 0.1005 13 0.0476 0.0704 
1 0.0405 0.0978 14 0.0483 0.0685 
2 0.0411 0.0951 15 0.0489 0.0667 
3 0.0416 0.0926 16 0.0496 0.0649 
4 0.0422 0.0901 17 0.0502 0.0631 
5 0.0428 0.0876 18 0.0509 0.0614 
6 0.0434 0.0853 19 0.0516 0.0597 
7 0.0439 0.0830 20 0.0523 0.0581 
8 0.0445 0.0807 21 0.0530 0.0566 
9 0.0451 0.0786 22 0.0537 0.0550 
10 0.0457 0.0764 23 0.0545 0.0536 
11 0.0464 0.0744       
12 0.0470 0.0724       
Source: Authors’ Computations 
 
